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In 2005, Safari first introduced private browsing, a feature that
enables a user to surf the Internet without leaving traces on
her local computer, such as history, cookies and temporary
files (Aggarwal et al., 2010). Since then, all other mainstream
browsers have added the same feature, including Internet
Explorer (IE) (Internet Explorer private browsing mode),
Chrome (Chrome private browsing mode) and Firefox (Mozilla
Firefox private browsing mode).
Although the basic aim of private browsing is the same, the
implementations vary greatly across different browsers. This
adds significant complexity to the subject. In USENIX Secu-
rity’10, Aggarwal, Burzstein, Jackson and Boneh first initiated
the study of the security of private browsing in modern
browsers and discovered several vulnerabilities (Aggarwal
et al., 2010). In particular, they studied the dire impact of
browser extensions on private browsing in Firefox (v3.6). A
year later, Said et al. (2011) continued the study of private
browsing. They focused on examining the content in the
volatile memory and found that artifacts from the privatecom (K. Satvat), m.j.forsh
d by Elsevier Ltd. All righsession remained in memory even after the session had been
closed. Recently, in ESORICS’13, Lerner et al. (2013) presented
a software tool that allows automatic verification of the
browser extensions’ compliance with the private mode. The
tool was mainly tested on Firefox extensions, although in
principle it could be easily extended to other browsers.
Apart from these three papers, the security of private
browsing seems to have been almost entirely neglected by the
security research community. To date, no study has existed
that systematically analyses the security of private browsing
across major web browsers and frommultiple angles: not just
examining the memory, but also the underlying database
structure on the disk and web traffic.
We believe this lack of attention is disproportionate to the
importance of the subject. Over the past five years since 2008,
private browsing has been extensively used by a significant
portion of Internet users (19% according to a survey (Aggarwal
et al., 2010)) to protect their privacy during web navigation
(Lerner et al., 2013). Given the prevalent use of private
browsing and the fact that many users are relying on it for
privacy, it is important to ensure that private browsing is
really as “private” as the browser vendors have claimed.aw@ncl.ac.uk (M. Forshaw), feng.hao@ncl.ac.uk (F. Hao), ehsan.
ts reserved.
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In this paper, we will present an independent and systematic
evaluation of the current state of private browsing in popular
browsers. Our contributions are summarised below.
1. Threat model: We refine a threat model for private
browsing based on adjusting a previous model (due to
Aggarwal et al. (2010)) in order to capture more realistic
threats in practice. This new model provides a concrete
definition of security, which allows us to evaluate the se-
curity of private browsing in a systematic manner.
2. Discovery of new attacks: We have performed a series of
concrete experiments and discovered a number of new
vulnerabilities across all the web browsers under study. In
particular, the attacks based on application crash, cross-
mode interference and remote timing measurements are
novel and are demonstrated to work in practice for the first
time.
3. Validation of known attacks: We have tested all previously
known vulnerabilities against the latest versions of web
browsers and are able to confirm that some still remain
unfixed.
Our preliminary research results were presented as a short
paper (8 pages) at the ESORICS workshop on Data Privacy
Management in September, 2013 (DPM’13) (Satvat et al., 2013).
They were based on evaluating the latest versions of the
mainstream web browsers as of April, 2013. However, being a
short paper, only the main outcomes of the attacks are sum-
marised. This journal paper includes full technical details for
each of the attacks, especially the working and quantitative
analysis of a novel remote timing attack in Section 5.2.
Furthermore, suggestions for countermeasures are added in
Section 6. We have informed the relevant browser vendors
about the attacks and received useful responses that are also
included in this paper. Some of the attacks have been fixed as
a result. To inform the reader about the latest situation, we
have re-tested all our attacks against the newest versions of
browsers as of February 2014 with updates to the previous
results included in this paper.
1.2. Outline
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 ex-
plains the researchmethodology used for this study. Section 3
defines a threat model for private browsing. The next two
sections, 4 and 5, present a series of experiments to expose
vulnerabilities of private browsing against local and remote
attackers respectively. Section 6 discusses countermeasures
for discovered vulnerabilities. Finally, Section 7 concludes our
study and suggests future research.
Table 1 e List of third-party software used in each
experiment.
Software Firefox Chrome IE Safari
VMware Player O O O O
WinHex O O O O
Index.dat Analyser N/A N/A O N/A
SQLite browser O O N/A O
SQLite manager O O N/A O2. Research methodology
In this research work, we took a forensic approach to collect
and analyse residual data left on the host computer after the
private browsing session. Virtualisation was used to prevent
any cross-contamination between experiments. In particular,VMware Player (a free version of VMware) was installed
(VMware Player Version 4.0.0). In terms of the operating sys-
tem, Windows 7 was chosen based on its popularity among
the Internet users. The latest versions of the four popular
browsers (as in April, 2013 (Most popular web browsers)) were
installed: Mozilla Firefox (19.0), Apple Safari (5.1.7), Google
Chrome (25.0.1364.97) and IE (10.0.9200.16521).
For each experiment a fresh Windows installation with a
single web browser was used. The experiments were carried
out for each browser to investigate possible residual data left
in memory or disk after private navigation. A set of freely
distributed third party tools were chosen (see Table 1), which
makes it possible for the reader to replicate the experiments.
Finally, all the software tools developed during the course of
this research work are released as open source (see Open
source code of the software tools). This should help browser
vendors to evaluate the security of their products and improve
accordingly.
A group of targeted websites were chosen to imitate a real
user’s behaviour in one browsing session, and to examine a
variety of elements involved in web browsing. Table 2 lists the
group of targeted websites and their characteristics. In each
experiment, the targeted websites were visited in the private
mode. The subsequent investigation involved closing the
private session and searching for any evidence left on the
computer. In most scenarios, this included searching for
specific keywords such as URL, cookies, or other content of
visited web pages.3. Threat model
The threat model for private browsing is defined in terms of
the attacker’s capabilities and their goals. In 2010, Aggarwal
et al. defined one threat model for private browsing. Our
model is similar to theirs but with some differences, as wewill
explain. Same as in Aggarwal et al., (2010), we will categorise
attackers into two types: local and remote attackers.3.1. Local attack
A local attacker is someone who has physical access to a
user’s machine. The threat model defined in Aggarwal et al.
(2010) restricts the local attack to “after the fact” forensics.
In other words, it is assumed that an attacker cannot have
physical access to the user’s computer before the private
browsing session (otherwise, the attacker may just install a
key logger and the attack would be trivial). On the other hand,
it is acknowledged in Aggarwal et al. (2010) that the user may
Table 2 e List of targeted websites and their
characteristics.
Website Characteristics
http://www.samy.pl/
evercookie
Ever-cookies include flash cookie,
IsoDataa and HTML 5 storageb
https://www.twitter.com/
time
Tweets streams and sizeable
photos
http://www.bbc.co.uk/
persian
Unicode transmission and videos
http://www.youtube.com Videos and online advertising
https://www.facebook.com Online chat and online advertising
a Siverlight Isolated Storage.
b This includes HTML5 Session Storage, Local Storage, Global
Storage and Database Storage.
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vate session. Our model about a local attacker is essentially
the same as that in Aggarwal et al. (2010) but with one dif-
ference: we explicitly assume at least one of the installed
third-party extensions were written by an attacker. Hence,
instead of surveying the third-party extensions and specu-
lating their behaviour as in Aggarwal et al. (2010), we chose to
write our own extensions as if from an attacker’s perspective.
This allows capturing the exact impact of browser extensions
more directly.3.2. Remote attack
For remote attacks, we assume the attacker is capable to
engage with the user in a web browsing session over HTTP(S).
This typically happenswhen a user navigates to awebsite that
is controlled by an attacker. The goal of the attacker is to
detect whether the user is in the privatemode. Given the often
negative connotation of using the private mode (also known
as the porn mode) for viewing adult websites (Aggarwal et al.,
2010), we consider the fact of using the privatemode a privacy
feature by itself.1 If the remotewebsite learns the user is in the
private mode, the user privacy may be invaded. For example,
if the user signs up a newsletter mailing list when he is in the
private mode, the remote server might customise the future
delivery of the newsletter content and push more adult-
oriented advertisements.
As compared with the model in Aggarwal et al. (2010), we
have excluded the threat of the remote website tracking the
user (e.g., based on IP addresses (Ruiz-Martı´nez, 2012) or
unique browser fingerprints (Eckersley, 2013)). This is because
in all browsers, private browsing has never been designed to
prevent web tracking (see specifications in Chrome private
browsing mode; Mozilla Firefox private browsing mode;
Safari private browsing mode; Internet Explorer private
browsing mode). Hence, it is not reasonable to insist on a
privacy feature that the product is not designed for. (We refer
interested readers to other privacy-preserving tools such as1 Although the private mode has been commonly used for
viewing adult websites according to the study (Aggarwal et al.,
2010), we should note that there are other usages as well, e.g., a
person may use the private mode to check emails on his friend’s
computer to avoid the browser remembering the password.TOR (The official website for the TOR project) for the preven-
tion of web tracking.)
Against the defined threat model, we conducted a series of
experiments to assess the security of private browsing among
the four popular browsers: Firefox, Chrome, IE and Safari.
Table 3 summarises the attacks, and their applicability to
specific browsers. Details of each attack will be explained
below.4. Local attacks
4.1. Summary of previously known attacks
4.1.1. Domain name system (DNS)
DNS caching has long been known as amajor threat to private
browsing (Aggarwal et al., 2010). This vulnerability is caused
due to the operating system caching the DNS queries sent by a
web browser regardless if it is in the private mode or not. The
results of our testing on DNS caching have confirmed that,
three years after it was reported in Aggarwal et al. (2010), this
vulnerability still persists in all browsers. Some third-party
extensions have been developed to address this issue (Click
& Clean; Clear DNS Cache), but none of them has been adop-
ted by browser vendors.
4.1.2. Memory inspection
Volatile memory can be a remarkable source of information
for forensic investigations. In 2011, Said et al. reported that
artifacts from a private browsing session were found left in
the primary memory after the exit of the session. We con-
ducted experiments to verify if the same vulnerability still
existed in the latest versions of browsers.
WinHex, a popular forensic tool, was used to extract con-
tent from RAM. The experimental results revealed that arti-
facts from private navigation persisted in memory even after
the browser was closed. They included information such as
visited URLs, password and cookies (see Fig. 1).
4.1.3. File timestamp
Timestamps are valuable evidence in any forensic investiga-
tion (Boyd and Forster, 2004). They often serve to reveal the
occurrence of an event at a precise time. In an operating
system, each file or folder has a timestamp of the “last
modified date”. In 2010, Aggarwal et al. compared the “last
modified date” for files in the profile directory before and after
the private browsing test using Firefox. They found the
timestamps had been changed while the sizes of the files
remained the same. Based on this observation, the authors
suggested that an attacker could deduce the occurrence of a
private session in the past. Our experiments showed that the
reported vulnerability had been fixed in the latest version of
Firefox. However, the same vulnerability was found to exist in
Chrome and Safari.
4.2. Index.dat
The Index.dat files are binary format log files used by IE to
store the user’s browsing history, cookies, temporary files, etc.
A number of such files are dispersed under different paths in
Table 3e List of attacks and their applicability to each browser. Thosemarkedwith * contain new results discovered by our
study, while others correspond to attacks that have been previously known but validated again by our study.
Firefox Chrome IE Safari Information leakage
Domain name system O O O O Browsing history
Memory inspection O O O O Browsing history, passwords, cookies
File timestamp  O  O When private mode was last used
Index.dat* N/A N/A O N/A When private mode was last used
SQLite database crash* O O N/A O Minor to serious depending on browsers
SQLite added bookmark* O O N/A O Minor to serious depending on browsers
Extension* O O  O Browsing history
Cross-mode Interference* N/A O N/A N/A User activities in private mode
Hyperlink attack O O O O If the user is in private mode
Timing attack* O O  O If the user is in private mode
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the visited web pages.
In order to evaluate the correlation between the private
mode (also called InPrivate in IE) and ‘Index.dat’ files,
Index.dat Analyser was installed in order to read and analyse
binary format log files. After the navigation of the targeted
websites in the private mode, Index.dat Analyser was used to
scrutinise residual traces left in the files. Our experiments
showed that, unlike in some earlier versions of IE, the latest
version successfully removed the traces of private navigation:
no history, cookies or cache records were found.
However, we found that adding bookmarks in the IE private
mode could lead to information leakage. The browser allows
users to freely add bookmarks just as in the usual mode.
Bookmarks added during a private session were stored as
standalone files under the %USERPROFILE%\Favorites direc-
tory with timestamps of the file creation time. On the other
hand, there is no matching URL for the added bookmark in
History.IE5\index.dat. A cross comparison between these files
could allow an attacker to deduce that the bookmark was
added in the privatemode; the timestampof the bookmark file
would indicate when the private browsing was used. The
attacker may sometimes get false positives as the user may
have added a bookmark in the usualmodewithout visiting theFig. 1 e Results of memory inspection after the exit of private s
artifact left from the session.link (e.g., right-click over a hyperlink to add it to the book-
marks). However, the false negatives are always zero.
4.3. SQLite database
SQLite is ANSI-C-based open source database used by Firefox,
Chrome and Safari to store historical records of browsing ac-
tivities (Jeon et al., 2011). The database is structured as a single
file saved under the browser’s profile folder. The paths of the
SQLite files used by different browsers are summarised in
Table 4.
To study the correlation between the private browsing
activities and the underlying SQLite database, we installed
SQLite Browser (Pereira, 2009) and SQLite Manager (SQLite
Manager) to examine the records in detail. Our experiments
reveal two vulnerabilities: one is related to the application
crash, and the other one related to adding bookmarks.
4.3.1. Application crash
There are many reasons why a browser program may termi-
nate in an unexpected way. For example, the programmay be
manually terminated by the user due to unresponsiveness;
there may be a sudden power loss; the web page contains too
much HTML data to load in the browser; the Javascript or Javaession in Firefox. The URL https://twitter.com/time was an
Table 4 e Paths of the SQLite database files in different
browsers.
Browser File directory
Firefox %APPDATA%\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\
<Random Value>\<FileName>.sqlite
Chrome %APPDATA%\Local\Google\Chrome\User
Data\<FileName>.sqlite
Safari %APPDATA%\Local\Apple
Computer\Safari\<FileName>.db
3 As of February 2014, the Safari browser (version 5.1.7) no
longer writes records to the database file during the private
browsing. Hence, the reported issue has been fixed.
4 After we filed a bug report (#14685058) about this flaw to
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the computational load, etc. The critical question is that: if the
program terminates in an unexpected way, will it leave un-
expected evidence on disk?
In Firefox, the SQLite database uses Write Ahead Logging
(WAL) mode to implement database transactions such as
atomiccommit and rollback. In thismode,WALfilesarecreated
at the first connection to the SQLite database and are deleted
when the last connection to the database is closed. However, in
the event of application crash database connections are not
closed cleanly and the WAL files will remain on disk until the
browser is restarted. We observed that the WAL files left from
the privatemode always had the zero size (since therewerenot
databaseupdates),while theWALfiles left fromtheusualmode
had non-zero size. Hence, based on the size of a WAL file and
the timestamp of it, an attacker will be able to deduce that a
private session occurred at a specific time. However, restarting
the browser in the usual mode will remove this evidence.
Chrome implements the SQLite database transactions
using Journal files instead of WAL mode. To speed up the
loading, the browser uses two SQLite databases to store the
history records: one named “History” and the other in the
form of “History Index YYYY-MM” (for example, “History
Index 2013-04” for April of 2013). In the usual mode, the
browser uses the two journal files for the two databases
respectively. However in the private mode, it just uses one
journal file (only for the “History” database). All journal files
will remain on disk in the event of application crash or power
loss. Based on the existence of only one journal file, an
attacker can deduce that a private session occurred and the
timestamp of the file reveals when. Similar to Firefox,
restarting the browser in the usual mode will remove the
evidence.2
The case of Safari is more serious. Unlike Firefox and
Chrome that only use in-memory SQLite database for private
browsing and do not write the visitedwebsites to the database
file on disk, Safari actually writes records of the visited web-
sites to the database file and removes them later. Only when
the browser is closed normally will those history records be
removed. Through experimentation, we found that if the
browser was closed in an abnormal way (e.g., a crash or forced
termination), the records of visited websites in the private
mode would remain in the database. These records will2 As of February 2014, the Chrome browser (version 32.0.17) has
changed the way the history files work. Instead of using two
SQLite files with names “History” and “History Index YYYY-MM”,
it now uses just one SQLite file named “Archived History”. Hence,
the reported issue has been fixed.persist on disk even after the browser is restarted. This flaw
poses a serious threat to the user’s privacy.3
4.3.2. Adding bookmarks
In Firefox, after visiting the targeted websites and adding a
bookmark in the private mode, SQLite Manager and SQLite
Browser (SQLite Manager) were used to examine the database
file named places.sqlite. This database kept records of all
visited URLs and added bookmarks. Within this database, two
are particularly relevant: moz_places, which stores the visited
websites; and moz_bookmarks, which stores bookmarks.
Our investigation revealed that a bookmark added during
the private mode was recorded in both tables. This was the
same as the implementation in the usual mode, except that
the “title” and “last_visit_date” fields were deleted (see Fig. 2).
A comparison of these two tables would disclose that the
bookmark was added during the private mode at a specific
time. It is worse than the earlier IE case, since the evidence is
definite: i.e., zero false positive and zero false negative.
Similarly, in Chrome, the URL for bookmarks added in the
private mode could be found in the “history” SQLite database.
Contrary to the implementation in the usual mode, the “vis-
it_count” field was set to 0 and the “hidden” field set to 1 (see
Fig. 3). Hence, a search for “visit_count ¼ 0 and hidden ¼ 1”
would conveniently disclose websites bookmarked in the
private mode with detailed timestamps, which in turn would
indicate precisely when private browsing was used.
The case of Safari is theworst. Under the normal operation,
Safari removes the browsing history in the privatemodewhen
the program is closed. However, we found that as long as the
user added one bookmark during the private navigation, all
the websites that were visited during the private session
would remain in the SQLite database e more specifically, in
the PageURL table of the WebpageIcons.db database file. We
have reported this bug to Apple, and learned that it would be
fixed in a newer version of Safari.44.4. Extensions
The effects of browser extensions on private browsing were
studied by Aggarwal et al. in 2010. Their study was mainly
focused on Firefox extensions and the adopted approach was
to survey the most popular 40 Firefox extensions and analyse
their behaviour. We extended their work in two aspects. First,
instead of analysing third party extensions (and speculating
their intentions), we wrote our own extensions; this allows us
to more directly capture the impact of extensions on private
browsing. Furthermore, the developed extensions cover not
just Firefox, but also Chrome, Safari and IE. (Note that in 2010Apple, we received a reply from Apple on 12 August, 2013: “En-
gineering has determined that this is not to be fixed”. We further
requested Apple to justify their decision. On 18 August, Apple
replied again: “After much deliberation, engineering has removed
this feature.”. As of February 2014, we find the latest version of
Safari (5.1.7) has fixed the reported issue; we can no longer find
private browsing records in the history file.
Fig. 2 e Adding a bookmark in the Firefox private mode.
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and IE did not yet support extensions.)
4.4.1. Chrome extension
Chrome extensions are designed to provide additional func-
tionality and augment default browsing behaviour. Chrome
extensions are based on web technologies, with Javascript
used for providing functionality, and user interfaces based
on HTML and CSS (Google Chrome Extensions). For thedemonstration purpose, we wrote a Chrome extension,
called Incognito Inspector (Open source code). Once this
extension was enabled in the Chrome private mode, it was
able to record detailed user activities for the duration of a
private browsing session, including when the tabs were
opened and closed, which web pages were visited and at
which time, how the user flipped between tabs and windows,
etc (see Fig. 4). These details can be sent to a remote server in
real time.
Fig. 3 e Chrome history SQLite. The highlighted record corresponds to a bookmark added in the private mode. The record
persists in the database with the “visit_count” field merely set to 0 and “hidden” set to 1.
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the private mode by default. This “disable-by-default” policy
significantly alleviates the threat. However, the fact that
Chrome allows the private and usual modes to run in parallel
renders this policy ineffective, aswewill explain in Section 4.5.
4.4.2. Safari extension
To illustrate the risks posed by extensions during private
browsing in Safari, we developed a similar inspector exten-
sion (Open source code) for Safari, which is able to record
details of the user’s activities within a private session. In Sa-
fari, extensions are enabled by default in the private mode.
Fig. 5 shows the Safari extension listing all websites that were
visited in the private mode.Fig. 4 e Chrome extension recording user4.4.3. Firefox extension
Similarly, an inspector extension (Open source code) was
developed for Firefox to record detailed user activities in a
private session. As with Safari, the Firefox extensions are
enabled in the private mode by default. As shown in Fig. 6, the
extension displays all the visited website during the private
navigation.
4.4.4. Internet Explorer
Unlike other browsers, the development of IE extensions re-
quires using .Net Framework based languages like C#. The
extension we developed (Open source code) uses the Browser
Helper Object (BHO) class, which provides a rich set of APIs to
extend the functionality of IE. In the usual mode, theactivities in private browsing session.
Fig. 5 e Safari extension showing the retrieved history of visited website during a private browsing session in a drop-down
menu.
j o u r n a l o f i n f o rma t i o n s e c u r i t y and a p p l i c a t i o n s 1 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 8e1 0 0 95extension can obtain the URL and the content of the HTML
page, which is represented in a DOM (Document Object Model)
structure. Like in Chrome, extensions are disabled by default
in the private mode. They can be enabled by a manual oper-
ation. However, after we manually enabled extensions in the
private mode, we found an enabled extension had only
restricted privilege: in particular, it could no longer invoke the
BHO class. Hence, our attack did not work on IE.
4.5. Cross-mode interference
In Chrome, extensions are disabled by default in the private
mode. But extensions in the usual mode are enabled. Since
Chrome allows the usual and private modes to run in parallel,Fig. 6 e Firefox extension recording visthis provides the attacker an opportunity to exploit the cross-
mode interference.
The attackwasmotivated by the following observation: the
Chrome://memory page displays all the opened tabs in the
browser regardless if they are in the usual or private mode
(Fig. 7). Accordingly, we developed an extension using the
standard Chrome extension APIs, installed it in the browser,
and left it disabled in the private mode.
The attack works as follows. In the usual mode, the
extension is able to invoke standard APIs to list all tabs, each
having a unique ID. If the tab is in the usual mode, the
extension can obtain further details about the tab, such as the
page title and URL. However, if the tab is in the private mode,
no response will be given. But, the precise lack of responseited websites in the private mode.
Fig. 7 e Chrome://memory interface.
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By periodically polling the tabs, the extension can detect the
existence of a private browsing session, the number of active
tabs opened in the private mode, when those tabs are opened
and when are they closed. Finally, the extension sends all the
collected data to a remote website (under our control).
In fact, Chrome also provides experimental APIs (which are
enabled in the chrome://flags interface) to further enforce the
extension’s functionality (Experimental Chrome extension
API). In particular, it provides the following additional infor-
mation about each tab: the CPU consumption, network
bandwidth and Frames Per Section (FPS). This information is
obtainable even for tabs in the private mode.
The extra information allows the attacker to draw an even
more fine-grained profile about the user activities within a
private session. Fig. 8 shows how the user’s activities are
correlatedwith the CPU consumption and network bandwidth
usage. Loading new pages increases the CPU and bandwidth
usage at the same time while scrolling pages only affects the
CPU consumption. When one is watching an HTML5 video,
there is a substantial increase of both the CPU usage and
network bandwidth.
We do not test the cross-mode interference for Firefox and
Safari, because extensions are enabled by default in the pri-
vatemode for both browsers. Hence, an attacker is better off to
steal sensitive information about private browsing directly
through the extension rather than by exploiting the cross-
mode interference.5. Remote attacks
Based on the threat model explained in Section 3, the fact that
a person used or is using the private mode is considered aprivacy feature by itself. However, existing implementations
of private browsing in several browsers allow a remote web-
site to easily tell if the user is using the private mode. In this
section, we will explain two attacks, based on checking the
colour of hyperlinks and the side-channel timing information
of writing cookies.5.1. Hyperlink attack
Normally a web browser displays an unvisited hyperlink in
blue and changes it to purple after the user clicks the link or
visits the URL. This is a conventional technique adopted by all
browsers to distinguish visited links from unvisited ones,
hence improving the user’s browsing experience (Collin et al.,
2006).
However, there are noticeable deviations for the same
mechanism to work in the private mode. As we have tested,
all browsers started a new private session with all hyper-
links displayed in blue. In several browsers (Chrome, Firefox
and Safari), the hyperlink never changes colour even after
the user has clicked the link or visited the URL. (One might
argue that this has the benefit of making it more difficult for
the remote website to track the visited pages than in the
usual mode since the colour of the hyperlink does not
change much; however, it is worth noting that defence
against web tracking is not within the threat model of pri-
vate browsing.)
These deviations clearly degrade the user experience;
furthermore, they create an exploit path for a remote attacker.
Based on the difference in the hyperlink colours, the remote
attacker is able to tell a privatemode apart from a usualmode.
As a result, the user may be presented with different web
pages and advertisements (that may contain more adult
content). For example, since in Chrome, Firefox and Safari, the
Fig. 8 e Profiling the user activities in the private mode based on the CPU and network usage.
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website can use JavaScript to check the colour of the hyper-
links and easily tell if the user is currently in the privatemode.
This vulnerability was first reported in Aggarwal et al. (2010)
and we find it still exists in the latest versions of the
browsers. However, the case of IE is a bit different. In the latest
version of IE, the colour of the hyperlink does change based on
the user’s clicking just like in the usual mode. However, the
private mode still deviates from the usual mode in that the
former always displays all hyperlinks in blue in the beginning
of the session. Hence, if the remote attacker is able to regularly
engage with the user in more than one sessions (e.g., the
remote attacker controls a news website), he can easily tell if
the user is in the private mode.
5.2. Timing attack
Timing attacks used to compromise the privacy of Internet
users are presented in the literature (Felten and Schneider,
2000). In this section, we describe a novel client-side
timing attack based on leveraging differences in time
taken to write a large number of cookies between usual and
private modes.Fig. 9 e Box plots representing timing da5.2.1. Implementation
We developed a simple PHP and MySQL application to mea-
sure the time taken to write a predefined number of cookies,
and then store these results to a database for further analysis.
The Selenium testing framework was used to automate
testing enabling large-scale experimentation.
5.2.2. Evaluation
We collected extensive timing measurements for the usual
and private modes (100 samples per mode per browser) as
training data (see Fig. 9). Normal distributions are fitted to
each training set.
We first assume the null hypothesis, namely: there is no
significant difference in timing betweenwriting cookies in the
private and usual modes. Obviously, if statistical tests reject
the null hypothesis, they will naturally support the alterna-
tive. The alternative would imply a weakness in the private
browsing implementation as the remote attacker would be
able to measure the difference and tell if the private mode is
switched on. From Fig. 9, one can intuitively tell that there is a
significant timing difference between the private and usual
modes for Chrome, Firefox and Safari. We now confirm that
intuition in more concrete terms by employing the standardta collected for browsers under test.
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Student’s t-test mainly because the sample size in our ex-
periments is relatively big (i.e.,>30). The z-test (Kreyszig, 1970)
is defined in Equation (1), where x is the sample mean, m is the
hypothesised mean, s is the population standard deviation5,
and n is the sample size.
ztestðm;XÞ ¼ x m
s
 ffiffiffi
n
p (1)
We calculate p-values representing the probability that a
given observation belongs to usual or private browsing mode,
as follows.
pðxÞ ¼ Fðxjm ¼ 0; s ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1
s
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2p
p
ZN
jxj
e
ðtmÞ2
2s2 dt (2)
We then employ a simple threshold policy where any
sample s from browser b whose p-value for private mode is
greater than its p-value for usual mode by a threshold interval
t is categorised as belonging to private mode. Our approach is
outlined in Equation (3), where busual and bprivate are training
sets for browser b in usual and private modes respectively.
fðs;b; tÞ ¼

Private if p

ztest

s;bprivate

> pðztestðs; busualÞÞ þ t
Usual else
(3)
We collected further 100 timing measurements for each
browser for each mode in order to evaluate the effectiveness
of our approach. There are two types of errors in the evalua-
tion. One is the False Acceptance Rate (FAR), that is the rate of
a usual browsing session being characterised as private. The
other is False Rejection Rate (FRR), that is the rate of a private
browsing session being characterised as in the usual mode.
The two error rates vary according to the threshold. Hence, in
the evaluation, we used the Equal Error Rate (EER) where the
FRR and FAR curves intersect. In the ideal case, the EER should
be close to 50%: i.e., the attacker detects the private/usual
mode no better than tossing a coin. However, as shown in
Table 5, with the exception of IE, a remote attacker is able to
correctly identify the browsing mode with high accuracy.Table 5 e Equal Error Rates for detecting the browsing
mode. The level of insecurity is expressed as j0:5LEERj:
the bigger the value is, the less secure.
Browser Equal Error
Rate (EER)
Threshold (t) Insecurity
j0:5 EERj
Google Chrome 1% 0 0.496. Countermeasures
We divide the causes of attacks into two categories: internal
elements that only concern the internal design of a browser,
and external elements that involve external interactions with
the rest of the system.
6.1. Internal elements
6.1.1. Adding bookmarks
Our research shows that adding bookmarks in the private
mode can cause privacy violation in several popular browsers
with a varying degree of severity. One countermeasuremay be
to disallow adding any bookmarks in the private mode (as
implemented in an earlier version of Chrome 20.0). However,5 Given our large sample size, we approximate the population
standard deviation as the sample standard deviation.this would cause inconvenience to users; there exist valid use
cases in which a user may want to add a bookmark while in
the private mode. In the existing implementation of private
browsing in popular browsers, users are completely unin-
formed about the potential information leakage associated
with adding bookmarks in the private mode. Hence, browser
vendors should at least add a mechanism to inform the user
about the potential privacy violation before a bookmark is
added, e.g., through the display of a warning dialogue.
6.1.2. SQLite database
We find SQLite temporary files usually remain on disk in the
event of the program crash or power off. In Chrome and
Firefox, the traces left on disk allow an attacker to deduce the
occurrence of private browsing in the past. In Safari, the traces
reveal the websites that were visited in the private session.
The browser crash is an edge case as it happens infrequently
in the normal usage. However, for a secure implementation,
all edge cases should be considered. For example, the obvious
flaw of the Safari browser retaining private navigation history
in the event of program crash should have been easily
detected in the in-house testing if Apple developers had
included all edge cases into the test framework.
6.1.3. Extension
We have shown that browser extensions can easily reveal the
user’s activities in the privatemode. So far only Chrome and IE
disable extension by default in the private mode. We recom-
mend other browsers to do the same. Furthermore, when an
extension is enabled in the private mode, the browser should
treat it differently as running in the usual mode, and restrict
its privileged access to extension APIs accordingly. Recently,
researchers have made progress in developing an automated
tool to verify the extensions’ compliance with the private
browsingmode (Lerner et al., 2013). Such tool can prove useful
if it is integrated into the web browser, so that only the
compliant extensions can be installed.
6.1.4. Cross-mode interference
Chrome allows the usual and private modes to run in parallel.
However, our research shows that an attacker is able to obtain
user-sensitive information in the private mode by exploiting
cross-mode interference. A safer approach is to run the
browser in a single mode only.
6.1.5. Hyperlinks
Our research shows that for all browsers, a remote attacker
can easily tell if a user is in the private mode by checking the
hyperlink colours. This is because the way a hyperlink isMozilla Firefox 9% 0 0.41
Internet Explorer 63% 0.0002 0.13
Apple Safari 1% 0.0055 0.49
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mode. Such deviations clearly degrade the user experience in
the private navigation mode. Furthermore, they do not seem
to provide any real advantage in making private browsing
more secure. On the contrary, based on such deviations, a
remote attacker is able to easily tell a privatemode apart from
a usual mode. We therefore recommend browser vendors to
remove these deviations. The mechanism for displaying hy-
perlinks should be same in the private mode as in the usual
mode. The only difference should be that in the private mode
the information about visited websites is not persistently
saved on disk once the session is closed.
6.1.6. Cookie timing
For several browsers, we observed a noticeable difference in
the time spent to write cookies between the usual and private
modes. This difference can be exploited by a remote attacker
to tell if the user is in the private mode. Usually, to mitigate
the effects of timing attacks, one commonly adopted coun-
termeasure is to insert random delays to reduce the timing
difference (e.g., see Kocher, 1996; Nadhem et al., 2013). The
same countermeasure may be applied here, but we believe it
is important to first understand why such differences exist.
Unfortunately, with our current state of knowledge, we
cannot fully explain what caused the timing differences. (One
may say writing cookies should be quicker in the private
mode as it is a memory-only operation and no data is written
to the disk. However, that intuitive explanation does not
seem to apply to Chrome.) More investigation in this aspect is
needed.
6.2. External elements
6.2.1. DNS
DNS cache retains the websites visited regardless if they are
from the usual or private mode. Some researchers have
already made progress in developing extensions to clean
the DNS cache (Click & Clean; Clear DNS Cache). It should
be possible for browser vendors to integrate such solutions
into the browser, so that records in the DNS cache related to
the private browsing can be sanitised in an automated
manner.
6.2.2. Memory
We have found artifacts in memory left from the private
navigation for all browsers under test. It seems browser ven-
dors have all failed to address this vulnerability, despite that it
was reported in 2011 (Said et al., 2011). Cleaning all individual
data from RAM is a computationally expensive procedure,
which may explain a lack of progress in this area. We are
unable to suggest any solution at this stage; more research is
needed in this area.
6.2.3. File timestamps
In the latest versions of Firefox and IE, we did not observe any
timestamp change of files under the profile directory after a
private browsing session. Both browsers chose to read data-
bases into memory and do not write any new record to the file
on the disk. This is a more secure approach, which we
recommend other browsers to follow.7. Conclusion
We have presented a range of vulnerabilities in the existing
implementations of private browsing across four popular web
browsers. The revealed problems highlight the complexity of
the subject and call for more attention from the security com-
munity. They also show that ad-hoc efforts to implement pri-
vate browsinge as currently adopted by browser vendorse can
easily lead to importantsecurity considerationsbeing ignored.A
more systematic approach to design, implement and test the
private browsing feature is needed e in particular, an appro-
priate threat model should be established so to provide a yard-
stick to measure security; edge cases that happen infrequently
(e.g., application crash, user adding bookmarks) should be
included inthetest framework;extensionsshouldbedisabled in
the private mode by default (otherwise, there must be some
automated tool, like the one developed in Lerner et al. (2013), to
strictly ensure the extensions’ compliance with the private
model); the browser should be run in a singlemode to avoid any
cross-mode interference; deviations between the private and
usualmodes should beminimised asmuch as possible so that a
remote attacker cannot reliably tell the two modes apart.Acknowledgement
The Firefox inspector extension was initially written by a
previousMSc student, Nicoleta Nicolaou, in 2011 in the School
of Computing Science, Newcastle University. The initial idea
of the remote attack based on writing cookies was inspired by
a freely available on-line manuscript (http://mocktest.net/
paper.pdf).r e f e r e n c e s
Aggarwal G, Burzstein E, Jackson C, Boneh D. An analysis of
private browsing modes in modern browsers. In: The 19th
USENIX Symposium on Security; 2010.
Boyd C, Forster P. Time and date issues in forensic computing-a
case study. Digit Investig 2004;1(1):18e23.
Chrome private browsing mode, https://support.google.com/
chrome/bin/answer.py?hl¼en&answer¼95464&p¼cpn_
incognito [Accessed April 2013].
Clear DNS Cache, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/
addon/clear-dns-cache/ [Accessed April 2013].
Click & Clean, https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/
ghgabhipcejejjmhhchfonmamedcbeod?utm_source¼chrome-
ntp-icon [Accessed April 2013].
Collin J, Bortz A, Boneh D, Mitchell CJ. Protecting browser state
from web privacy attacks. In: The 15th international
conference on World Wide Web (WWW); 2006.
Eckersley P. How unique is your web browser?, Available at:
https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf
[Accessed April 2013].
Experimental Chrome extension API, http://developer.chrome.
com/extensions/experimental.html [Accessed April 2013].
Felten WE, Schneider MA. Timing attacks on Web privacy. In: The
7th ACM conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS); 2000.
j o u rn a l o f i n f o rma t i o n s e c u r i t y an d a p p l i c a t i o n s 1 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 8e1 0 0100Google Chrome Extensions, http://code.google.com/chrome/
extensions/overview.html [Accessed April 2013].
Index.dat Analyzer, http://www.systenance.com/indexdat.php
[Accessed April 2013].
Internet Explorer private browsing mode, http://windows.
microsoft.com/en-us/windows-vista/what-is-inprivate-
browsing [Accessed April 2013].
Jeon S, Bang J, Byun K. A recovery method of deleted record for
SQLite database. Personal Ubiquitous Comput
2011;16(6):707e15.
Kocher PC. Timing attacks on implementations of
DiffieeHellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In: Proceedings
of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on
Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO ’96); 1996. pp. 104e13.
Kreyszig E. Introductory mathematical statistics. John Wiley &
Sons Inc; 1970.
Lerner BS, Elberty L, Poole N, Krishnamurthi S. Verifying web
browser extensions’ compliance with private-browsing mode.
In: Proceedings of the 18th European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security (ESORICS); 2013.
Most popular web browsers, http://www.w3schools.com/
browsers/browsers_stats.asp [Accessed April 2013].
Mozilla Firefox private browsing mode, http://support.mozilla.
org/en-US/kb/private-browsing-browse-web-without-saving-
info [Accessed April 2013].
Nadhem J, Fardan A, Paterson K. Lucky thirteen: breaking the
TLS and DTLS record protocols. In: Proceedings of 2013
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P); 2013.
pp. 526e40.Open source code of the software tools developed during the
research work of this paper, http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/m.
j.forshaw1/privatebrowsing/.
Pereira MT. Forensic analysis of the Firefox 3 Internet history and
recovery of deleted SQLite records. Digit Investig
2009;5(3):93e103.
Ruiz-Martı´nez A. A survey on solutions and main free tools for
privacy enhancing Web communications. J Netw Comput Appl
2012;35(5):1473e92.
Safari private browsing mode, http://support.apple.com/kb/
PH5000 [Accessed April 2013].
Said H, Mutawa AH, Awadhi AI, Guimaraes M. Forensic analysis
of private browsing artifacts. In: International Conference on
Innovations in Information Technology (IIT); 2011.
Satvat K, Forshaw M, Hao F, Toreini E. On the privacy of private
browsing e a forensic approach (short paper). In: Proceedings
of the 8th International Workshop on Data Privacy
Management (DPM’13); 2013.
Selenium, http://seleniumhq.org/ [Accessed April 2013].
SQLite Manager, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-us/firefox/addon/
sqlite-manager/ [Accessed April 2013].
Standard Chrome extension API, http://developer.chrome.com/
extensions/ [Accessed April 2013].
The official website for the TOR project, https://www.torproject.
org/ [Accessed April 2013].
VMware Player Version 4.0.0, http://www.vmware.com/products/
player/ [Accessed April 2013].
WinHex, Computer forensics & data recovery software, http://
www.winhex.com/winhex/ [Accessed April 2013].
